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Executive Summary 
 
Demand is growing for counter-cyclical 
farm program payments. One proposal, 
Supplemental Income Payments for 
Producers (SIPP), would pay farmers 
when national farm revenue falls below a 
certain percentage of average national 
farm revenue for a crop within a year. The 
cost of this policy at the 95 percent 
payment trigger level would have 
averaged $1.47 billion per year had it been 
in place from 1977 to 1999. Corn farmers 
would have received 40 percent of 
payments, soybean farmers 20 percent, 
wheat farmers 23 percent, cotton farmers 7 
percent, and rice farmers 3 percent. 
One problem with a national revenue 
approach is that farmers in a particular 
state or region could suffer yield losses but 
still not receive a payment. An alternative 
policy that addresses this problem could 
base payments on county revenues or 
revenues at the crop reporting district 
level. A county-based program at the 95 
percent trigger level would have cost an 
average of $2.65 billion per year from 
1977 to 1999. Corn farmers would have 
received 35 percent of payments,  
soybean farmers 22 percent, wheat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
farmers 22 percent, cotton farmers 10 
percent, and rice farmers 2 percent. 
A revenue guarantee based on past 
revenue outcomes is likely to influence 
planting decisions when the market price 
for a crop falls significantly. Because a 
drop in market price before planting would 
greatly increase the likelihood that a 
farmer would receive a program payment, 
his or her planting decisions could be 
significantly influenced by the government 
program. If, on the other hand, the 
guarantee was based on the futures market, 
the farmers’ market incentives and 
government program incentives for 
planting decisions would be better aligned. 
Adoption of a SIPP policy at the 
county or crop reporting district level 
would greatly decrease the total amount of 
risk that farmers face, thus decreasing the 
usefulness of the crop insurance program 
as it now exists. A more privatized crop 
insurance program could emerge as 
insurance companies could offer insurance 
against losses that would not be covered 
by program payments.
  
 
 
 
COUNTER-CYCLICAL AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM PAYMENTS: 
IS IT TIME TO LOOK AT REVENUE? 
 
Political support is clearly growing for 
some modification of farm policy. Lack of 
sustainability of the current program is 
best demonstrated by the disaster assis-
tance packages during the last three years, 
which have allocated billions of dollars to 
farmers. There is pressure on the Agricul-
ture Committees of the U.S. House and 
Senate to discuss possible changes to the 
farm bill.  
One of the perceived weaknesses of 
the current policy (as originally designed) 
is that cash transition payments are paid to 
farmers even when market income is high, 
and the size of the payments does not 
increase when market income is low. 
Many are concluding that support for 
farmers should be counter-cyclical, in that 
payments should increase when market 
income goes down, and they should 
decrease when times are good. 
Previous farm bills, with their defi-
ciency payments, were counter-cyclical 
with regard to agricultural prices. When 
farm prices exceeded the government’s set 
target price, no deficiency payments were 
made. However, when farm prices fell 
below the target price, deficiency pay-
ments were made and the payment was 
meant to counteract the low farm prices. 
Federally subsidized yield insurance still 
provides a counter-cyclical mechanism for 
crop yields. If yields fall below a given 
level, the producer receives an indemnity 
payment. 
It is revenue that keeps a farm in 
business. Deficiency payments and yield 
insurance target components of revenue, 
but not revenue itself. Farmers could 
receive high prices and still be in financial 
difficulty if their yields are low; and low 
prices might not signal financial problems 
if yields are high. Very recent additions to 
the crop insurance mix (Crop Revenue 
Coverage, Revenue Assurance, Group 
Risk Income Protection, and Income 
Protection) demonstrate that programs 
based on revenue are feasible. Basing 
federal payments on some measure of 
farm revenue is an idea that is gaining 
advocates. One such program, titled 
Supplemental Income Payments for 
Producers (SIPP, House Resolution 2792), 
has been introduced by Representative 
Charles Stenholm (D-Texas). 
In this briefing paper, we examine 
counter-cyclical revenue programs for 
U.S. agriculture. We outline several 
variations on the structure of the revenue 
program, discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of each. We then look at the 
possible government outlays under three 
example programs by assuming they had 
been in place over the period 1977–99. 
 
Supplemental Income Payments 
for Producers (SIPP) 
Because SIPP has been introduced as a bill 
in Congress, we will use it as a base 
from which to compare alternative 
counter-cyclical revenue programs. SIPP 
makes payments to producers of a crop 
when the per-acre national gross revenue 
for that crop falls below a set percentage 
2 / Hart and Babcock  
of the five-year average of that crop’s per 
acre national gross revenue. We refer to 
this revenue level as the payment trigger. 
Eligible crops are wheat, oilseeds, cotton, 
rice, and feed grains. Under SIPP, national 
gross revenue is the product of the total 
U.S. production of the crop for the year 
and the price established for the crop for 
the year. The crop price is set at the higher 
of the season average price received by 
producers or the loan rate for the crop. The 
total amount of payments to each crop 
under the program is equal to the number 
of harvested acres for the crop multiplied 
by the difference between the payment 
trigger and the current year’s per acre 
national gross revenue. 
Table 1 shows the hypothetical pay-
ments for the period 1977–99 under a 
national revenue program with a 95 
percent revenue trigger, consistent with 
the SIPP proposal. On average, the 
program would have provided just under 
$1.5 billion in payments to producers 
each year. In 6 out of the 23 years 
examined there would have been no 
payments made under the program. For 
1986, 1998, and 1999, payments would 
have exceeded $6 billion.  
SIPP is designed to deliver payments 
when market revenue is lower than the 
average of the previous five years. As 
such, the program automatically responds 
to the conditions similar to those ad-
dressed by the last three disaster assistance 
programs. The program would be largely 
free of the moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems of the crop insurance 
program because payments depend on 
national triggers. Moral hazard refers to 
the possibility that producers will engage 
in “riskier” activities or change their 
behavior in order to increase their chances 
of receiving a payment. Adverse selection 
refers to the notion that the producers who 
seek insurance are those who are most 
likely to collect. Because the size of the 
payment depends on national price and 
production, farm-level activity can have 
no effect on the size or the likelihood of a 
payment. With SIPP, agricultural “disas-
ters” are legislatively defined. This may 
lessen the political pressure for Congress 
to pass yearly ad hoc disaster programs 
that often result in payments that reflect 
the political realities of Congress rather 
than financial difficulties on the farm. 
 
Potential Drawbacks of SIPP 
Lack of Regional 
Counter-Cyclical Payments 
SIPP payments can be triggered by either 
low prices or low national yields. As 
shown in Table 1, payments would have 
been triggered for corn producers in 1988 
due to the midwestern drought. And in 
1998 and 1999, payments would have 
been triggered by the steep drop in season-
average price. It is much more likely, 
however, that SIPP payments will be 
triggered by low prices than low yields for 
the simple reason that when price is low in 
one region, it is low in all regions, which 
results in low national revenue. But when 
yields are low in one production region, 
they are unlikely to be low in all produc-
tion regions because weather conditions 
are not perfectly correlated across the 
country. This implies that regional yield 
disasters can occur without triggering 
SIPP payments (i.e., production in other 
areas would make up for a regional 
shortfall). 
To illustrate this point, Figure 1 
shows actual and trend Iowa corn yields 
from 1977 to 2000. Iowa corn producers 
suffered four bad production years during 
this period but would have received SIPP 
payments only in two of those years (1977 
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and 1988). The 1993 production year was 
a disaster by any measure for Iowa corn 
producers, but production in other regions 
was high enough that national revenue 
was too high to trigger a payment. In 
contrast, 1988 was extremely bad also, but 
the 1988 drought hit enough regions so 
that a payment was triggered. Figure 2 
illustrates a similar phenomenon for 
cotton. Texas cotton yields in 1980 were 
less than two- thirds of trend, yet produc-
ers would not have received a SIPP 
payment because production was high 
enough in other regions. 
A program based on national revenue 
will not capture all regional disasters and, 
consequently, would fail to be counter-
cyclical at the state or regional level. In 
addition, a program based on national 
revenue will also result in payments being 
made to producers in a region that has not 
suffered a loss. For example, in the 1988 
drought year, most Nebraska farmers 
enjoyed both high yields, due to irrigation, 
and high prices, due to drought conditions 
in the rest of the Corn Belt. Yet like all 
corn farmers, Nebraska farmers would 
have received a SIPP payment. 
 
Attributes of a 
County-Based Program 
Basing SIPP payments on county revenue 
instead of national revenue would fix the 
problem of SIPP not being regionally 
counter-cyclical. A county-based program 
would have paid Iowa corn farmers more 
in 1993—$652 million—than in any other 
year. And Texas cotton producers would 
have been paid more in 1980—$276 
million—than in any other year. In both 
cases, a nationally based SIPP program 
would not have paid. This starkly illus-
trates that the worse revenue years in a 
state—even in states that have the most 
acreage of a crop—may not result in a 
SIPP payment with a national trigger.  
A county-level program also would 
reduce payments to producers who do not 
suffer a loss. Nebraska corn farmers would 
have received only $17 million in 1988 
from a county-level program, whereas 
they would have received $216 million 
from a national-level program. North 
Carolina corn growers would have 
received only $300,000 from a county 
program in 1988 but $32 million from a 
national SIPP. 
Basing SIPP on county yields could 
be easily accomplished. Payment triggers 
could be based on the five-year average 
per-acre gross revenue at the county level. 
The price employed in calculating 
revenues is still given at the national level, 
but production is measured at the county 
level. The National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS) provides this level of crop 
production and price information. The 
trade-off between this variation and the 
national-level program is that the county-
level program would respond better to 
regional disasters, but it would also require 
higher government outlays for a given 
trigger percentage. Other program 
variations on the same theme would use 
crop reporting district- or state-level 
production or state-level prices. As the 
level of aggregation decreases (from 
national, to state, to crop reporting district, 
to county), the government costs (and 
producer benefits) increase. All of the 
other advantages of the national-level 
program are maintained. 
Table 2 shows the payments by crop, 
and in total, under the county revenue 
program with a 95 percent revenue trigger. 
The overall payments would have ranged 
from $91 million in 1979 to $9.78 billion 
in 1999. Average payments over the 
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period would have been $2.65 billion, 
which is nearly double the amount from 
the national trigger. The program would 
have been triggered in every year of the 
period. Estimates of the costs of revenue 
programs based on state or crop reporting 
district information and a 95 percent 
revenue trigger are shown in Figure 3. 
 
The Durum Wheat Problem 
In the fall of 1998, Crop Revenue 
Coverage (CRC) was expanded to include 
durum wheat. The price used to set the 
CRC spring revenue guarantee was the 
futures market price for spring wheat plus 
the average difference between durum 
wheat harvest prices and other spring 
wheat harvest prices during the previous 
five years. This difference amounted to 
$1.92/bu. But in the fall of 1998, the 
difference between futures prices of durum 
and other spring wheat was less than 
$0.50/bu. This meant that durum wheat 
farmers signing up for CRC would have a 
high likelihood of receiving a large 
insurance payment. Not surprisingly, 
planned durum wheat plantings in North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota 
skyrocketed. In response, the futures price 
for durum wheat actually fell below the 
price of spring wheat on the Minneapolis 
Grain Exchange.  
This illustrates the potential drawback 
of basing SIPP payments on past market 
prices and current planting decisions. 
When the market price outlook for a crop 
is currently much lower than prices 
received in the previous five years, the 
promise of a SIPP payment will tend to 
increase planted acreage, which will tend 
to decrease market prices. This tendency 
to base planting decisions on the govern-
ment program would be especially large 
when the program is based on national  
revenue calculations because bumper 
crops at the regional level will not 
necessarily decrease the chances of a 
program payment.  
 
SIPP Guarantees Based 
on Market Prices 
Another alternative to the SIPP proposal 
would be to incorporate current market 
signals into the program by basing the 
payment trigger on current expectations of 
market prices as indicated by futures 
prices. The revenue insurance products 
now available work in this way. The 
government cost implications of this 
variation are not readily predictable over 
the long run. In any given year, if the 
futures price is greater than the five-year 
average price, then costs would be 
expected to be greater in that year. If the 
futures price is lower, then costs will be 
lower. One problem with this approach is 
that futures markets do not exist for all 
commodities. Revenue insurance products 
have accounted for a lack of futures 
markets by basing the price for non-futures 
commodities on the price from a futures 
commodity and the historical relationship 
between the prices of the two crops. 
For the variation using the futures 
price as part of the revenue trigger, we 
examine only corn and soybean. For the 
futures prices, we use the February 
average settlement prices on the December 
corn and November soybean Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT) contracts to set 
the revenue guarantee. The harvest 
revenue is based on the average settlement 
price in October on the November soybean 
CBOT contract for soybeans and the 
average settlement price in November on 
the December corn CBOT contract for 
corn. This pattern follows the pricing 
structure employed in most revenue 
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insurance policies that are now available 
for corn and soybeans. 
Tables 3 and 4 show corn and soy-
bean payments under the national and 
county programs, respectively. Over the 
period studied, basing program guarantees 
on futures prices would have increased 
payments by 22 percent. However, the 
futures-based programs did not pay out 
more in every year. For the national 
program, the futures-based version paid 
out more in nine of the years; the season-
average-based version paid out more in six 
years; and neither paid out in eight of the 
years. For the county program, the futures-
based version provided greater benefits in 
15 of the 23 years. The yearly pattern of 
payments also changed with the price 
structure. For example, for corn under the 
national revenue program, payments 
would have been triggered in 1977, 1986–
88, and 1998–99 under the season-average 
price formulation; but under the futures 
price formulation, payments would have 
been made in 1977, 1981–83, 1986, 1989, 
1991–92, 1996, and 1998–99.  
 
The Effect of Varying the  
Revenue Trigger 
Figure 4 shows how average program 
payments change as the revenue trigger 
percentage changes for both the county 
program and the national program. 
Varying the trigger percentage changes the 
total outlays from $552 million at the 75 
percent level to $3.57 billion at the 100 
percent level for the county program. The 
county program costs nearly 10 times 
more than the national program at the 75 
percent trigger, but less than twice as 
much at the 100 percent trigger.  
 
SIPP Based on Combined 
Crop Revenues 
Press reports indicate that the Commission 
on 21st Century Production Agriculture 
may recommend a variation of SIPP based 
on combined revenues from barley, corn, 
cotton, oats, rice, sorghum, soybeans, and 
wheat. To examine how this variation may 
work, we have calculated the payments for 
a SIPP program where the per-acre 
revenue trigger is based on the ratio of the 
previous five-year sum of values of 
production and the previous five-year sum 
of harvested acres for the eight crops. 
Actual per-acre revenues are given by the 
current year’s sum of values of production 
and harvested acres for the eight crops. 
We refer to this program as a combined 
crop SIPP. 
At a 95 percent revenue trigger, the 
crop-specific versions of SIPP would have 
provided roughly $500 million more in 
payments than the combined crop SIPP. 
The reduction in payments is due to 
revenue shortfalls in one crop being offset 
by revenue gains in another. The number 
of payments also differs between the crop-
specific and combined crop SIPP pro-
grams. Table 5 shows this difference in 
payment streams. At the national level, the 
crop-specific SIPP program would have 
paid out in 17 of the 23 years, but the 
combined crop SIPP program would have 
paid out only in three years (1986, 1998, 
and 1999). In those years, the combined 
crop SIPP program at the national level 
paid out over $6 billion a year. This 
indicates that the outlays of a combined 
crop SIPP program with a national-level 
trigger will vary significantly, with no 
payments being made in most years and  
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billions of dollars in payments being made 
in a few years. Note that the pattern of 
payments under the combined crop SIPP 
program closely follows the pattern of aid 
packages that Congress has recently put 
together. Large supplemental farm 
payments were allocated in 1998 and 
1999, and a record amount of farm 
payments were made for the 1986 crop. 
This reinforces the finding of this report 
that national-level counter-cyclical 
payments would be triggered by low 
prices rather than by low yields. 
 
The Effect of SIPP on 
Crop Insurance 
Adoption of a county-level SIPP program 
would essentially remove nearly all 
systemic (non-poolable) sources of risk 
from farm-level revenue. The remaining 
risk would be price basis risk and farm-
level yield losses caused by local flooding, 
pest problems, hail, and wind damage. The 
proportion of systemic risk that exists with 
total risk varies by region; however, 
evidence suggests that provision of a 
county-based SIPP program would greatly 
reduce farm-level risk, and this potentially 
would have profound consequences on the 
crop insurance industry.  
Under the current crop insurance pro-
gram, the government provides premium 
subsidies as an incentive for farmers to 
purchase crop insurance from private 
companies. The crop insurance companies 
must offer insurance to every farmer at 
rates that are set by the government. In 
return for following these restrictions, the 
companies receive reimbursement from 
the government for selling the policies and 
adjusting the losses. The government also 
offers subsidized reinsurance, which is 
important because a large proportion of 
crop insurance claims are caused by events 
 that affect a significant portion of 
policyholders, such as widespread 
droughts or price declines. For example, 
the price decline in 1998 meant that nearly 
all Revenue Assurance policyholders in 
Iowa qualified for an indemnity payment.  
Systemic sources of losses are not the 
sort of losses that insurance companies 
prefer to insure. Rather, they prefer to 
insure poolable risks because the losses to 
the few would be paid by the premiums of 
the many. Thus, there is a sort of bargain 
struck between the crop insurance 
companies and the federal government. 
The companies will administer the 
program for the government, and, in 
return, the companies can transfer a large 
portion of the systemic risk to the 
government. 
It is important to note that under a 
county-level SIPP program, the govern-
ment would accept the transfer of risk 
directly from farmers, and would therefore 
have little justification to underwrite the 
private-sector crop insurance companies. 
The SIPP payments would cover a large 
portion of the total revenue risk on the 
farm, and the demand for crop insurance 
surely would decrease substantially in 
most locations. 
There still would be some demand 
for insurance, however, because nonsys-
temic risks are not the only sources of 
risk that are important to farmers. A 
private crop insurance industry could 
emerge to cover nonsystemic losses, 
much like the crop-hail insurance 
industry now does. A policy could be a 
“residual risk” policy that would compen-
sate for farm-level losses in excess of 
losses covered by SIPP payments, or that 
would compensate for losses in years in 
which SIPP payments were zero. 
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TABLE 1. SIPP program payments with 95 percent revenue trigger ($ million) 
 Barley Corn Cotton Oats Rice Sorghum Soybean Wheat Total 
1977 78 610 0 0 0 19 0 1381 2088 
1978 0 0 0 1 167 0 0 84 252 
1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 155 0 176 0 332 
1983 0 0 0 0 66 121 0 0 187 
1984 0 0 0 0 88 209 1331 0 1627 
1985 192 0 0 37 0 0 323 142 694 
1986 412 2532 161 121 0 197 729 2463 6615 
1987 123 1539 0 0 0 130 0 1049 2841 
1988 0 1908 0 0 30 0 0 0 1938 
1989 0 0 0 12 0 156 0 0 168 
1990 0 0 0 64 50 0 0 129 244 
1991 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 0 74 
1992 0 0 16 0 25 0 0 0 40 
1993 0 0 128 8 0 0 0 0 136 
1994 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 77 3222 453 47 0 245 1652 1164 6860 
1999 52 3813 1463 38 401 201 2512 1194 9674 
Average 41 592 97 18 43 56 292 331 1468 
 
8 / Hart and Babcock  
TABLE 2. County revenue program payments with 95 percent revenue trigger  
($ million) 
 Barley Corn Cotton Oats Rice Sorghum Soybean Wheat Total 
1977 110 1600 72 39 24 137 86 1388 3458 
1978 46 184 310 41 183 109 82 344 1299 
1979 7 6 13 5 0 4 28 29 91 
1980 12 247 374 7 0 69 560 126 1395 
1981 4 89 129 1 6 197 671 196 1294 
1982 7 18 116 13 154 177 626 138 1248 
1983 16 1040 85 16 64 239 541 86 2088 
1984 101 423 115 8 89 457 1808 382 3383 
1985 240 160 77 50 14 312 1008 802 2662 
1986 349 2565 327 114 8 237 1181 2318 7099 
1987 117 1620 24 12 7 163 121 1029 3093 
1988 147 2688 318 34 46 33 442 620 4329 
1989 20 336 116 54 2 216 332 377 1453 
1990 8 174 89 73 60 69 212 602 1287 
1991 13 617 283 76 0 70 427 482 1968 
1992 42 445 342 13 41 44 268 195 1391 
1993 34 1520 513 34 1 63 655 285 3105 
1994 46 64 23 16 7 27 38 186 406 
1995 0 9 321 1 0 12 141 73 558 
1996 7 160 59 1 0 91 29 209 555 
1997 35 264 99 7 0 41 76 729 1251 
1998 106 3249 729 47 32 250 1835 1394 7642 
1999 77 3849 1417 36 389 194 2511 1308 9781 
Average 67 927 259 30 49 140 595 578 2645 
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TABLE 3. National revenue program payments with 95 percent revenue triggers  
($ million) 
 Using Season-Average Prices  Using Futures Prices 
 Corn Soybean Total  Corn Soybean Total 
1977 610 0 610  1647 903 2550 
1978 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1979 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1980 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0  3157 2039 5196 
1982 0 176 176  1603 1599 3202 
1983 0 0 0  188 0 188 
1984 0 1331 1331  0 1685 1685 
1985 0 323 323  0 0 0 
1986 2532 729 3261  824 0 824 
1987 1539 0 1539  0 0 0 
1988 1908 0 1908  0 0 0 
1989 0 0 0  472 1981 2453 
1990 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1991 0 0 0  857 0 857 
1992 0 0 0  252 0 252 
1993 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1994 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1995 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0  622 0 622 
1997 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1998 3220 1652 4872  2536 1586 4122 
1999 3813 2512 6325  2147 645 2792 
Average 592 292 884  622 454 1076 
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TABLE 4. County revenue program payments with 95 percent revenue triggers  
($ million) 
 Using Season-Average Prices Using Futures Prices 
 Corn Soybean Total Corn Soybean Total 
1977 1600 86 1686 2429 1074 3503 
1978 184 82 266 74 55 130 
1979 6 28 34 8 62 70 
1980 247 560 807 638 884 1522 
1981 89 671 760 3258 2170 5428 
1982 18 626 644 2044 1743 3787 
1983 1040 541 1581 1396 335 1731 
1984 423 1808 2231 581 2107 2688 
1985 160 1008 1168 270 522 792 
1986 2565 1181 3746 1044 331 1375 
1987 1620 121 1741 68 40 108 
1988 2688 442 3130 1555 611 2166 
1989 336 332 668 1345 2168 3512 
1990 174 212 386 612 190 802 
1991 617 427 1044 1701 627 2328 
1992 445 268 714 1452 383 1835 
1993 1520 655 2176 1360 715 2074 
1994 64 38 101 780 262 1041 
1995 9 141 150 51 218 268 
1996 160 29 189 1338 475 1812 
1997 264 76 339 391 173 564 
1998 3249 1835 5084 2770 1793 4564 
1999 3849 2511 6360 2353 1018 3371 
Average 927 595 1522 1196 781 1977 
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TABLE 5. National program payments with 95 percent revenue triggers ($ million) 
 Crop-Specific SIPP  Combined-Crop SIPP 
 Total  Total 
1977 2088  0 
1978 252  0 
1979 0  0 
1980 0  0 
1981 0  0 
1982 332  0 
1983 187  0 
1984 1627  0 
1985 694  0 
1986 6615  6247 
1987 2841  0 
1988 1938  0 
1989 168  0 
1990 244  0 
1991 74  0 
1992 40  0 
1993 136  0 
1994 3  0 
1995 0  0 
1996 0  0 
1997 0  0 
1998 6860  6551 
1999 9674  8496 
Average 1468  926 
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FIGURE 1. Iowa corn yields: 1977–2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Texas cotton yields: 1977–2000 
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FIGURE 3. SIPP average costs: 1977–1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Percentage payment trade-off 
